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The effective tax burden on the returns 
from  long-term investments held by many 
 high-net-worth households in the United States 
is determined in significant part by the interac-
tion between the income tax treatment of capital 
gains and the estate tax, in particular the tax pro-
vision that allows basis  step-up for assets that 
are passed to beneficiaries at death.
To illustrate the importance of basis  step-up, 
consider a  zero-basis asset on which an investor 
accrues a one dollar capital gain at time zero. 
Assume that the future expected return each 
period on this asset is r, that the investor applies 
the same discount rate r to future capital gains 
tax liabilities, and that in all future periods the 
investor has a probability p of needing to sell 
the asset and a probability q of dying. Ignore the 
possibility that the asset may decline in value, 
which would raise issues of  loss-harvesting for 
tax purposes and complicate the analysis of the 
effective tax burden.
If the investor has not yet sold the asset and 
dies after k periods, the asset passes to his benefi-
ciaries, who will sell the asset upon receipt. With 
basis  step-up, the tax basis for the  beneficiaries 
is (1 + r ) k . Since this is also the market value 
at the time of sale, there is no capital gains tax 
liability when heirs sell the asset. The probabil-
ity that capital gains taxes are ever collected on 
the initial one dollar gain is p/( p + q), and the 
probability that the gains are not taxed as a result 
of basis  step-up is q/( p + q). The expected 
present discounted value of the capital gains tax 
liability on the initial gain is
 PDV CG Tax =  ∑ 
j=1
∞
 p ×  (1 − p − q)  j−1 
 × {τ ×  (1 + r)  j−1 } / (1 + r)  j−1 
 =  τ p  ×  ∑ 
j=0
∞
 (1  −  p  −  q)  j =  τ p _ p  + q. 
In the absence of basis  step-up at death, the 
expected present value of the capital gains tax 
liability would be τ, the same as if the gain was 
realized when it accrued, because the asset and 
the gain are assumed to rise in value at the inves-
tor’s discount rate.
The effect of basis  step-up on effective cap-
ital gains tax burdens has attracted research 
attention for decades. Bailey (1969) compared 
capital gain realizations reported on tax returns 
with an estimate of accruing stock gains for indi-
viduals over the  1926–1961 period. He inferred 
that more than  two-thirds of individuals’ gains 
on corporate stock were not taxed because the 
stocks were passed at death, which implies 
p/( p + q) < 1/3.
More recent research has tried to estimate 
unrealized gains as a fraction of the fair market 
value of the assets that are bequeathed each year, 
a ratio that provides information on the revenue 
impact of basis  step-up but does not bear directly 
on p/( p + q). Poterba and Weisbenner (2001) 
used data from the 1998 Survey of Consumer 
Finances that included estimates of the current 
market value of asset holdings and the purchase 
price of these assets, along with estimates of 
the  one-year mortality rates for survey respon-
dents, to estimate unrealized gains as a share 
of the market value of assets held by potential 
decedents who might be subject to the estate 
tax. Their results  suggested that  unrealized 
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gains would represent about one-third of the 
gross market value of assets that were included 
in taxable estates. Avery, Grodzicki, and Moore (2013) applied a similar algorithm to data from 
the 2010 Survey of Consumer Finances. They 
found unrealized gains as a share of market value 
of about one-third for estates with total values 
close to the estate tax threshold, i.e., between $5 
and $10 million. Gains represented more than 
half of the value of estates worth more than $100 
million.
The effective capital gains tax rate cannot be 
inferred from the fraction of an estate’s value 
that consists of unrealized appreciation. In the 
simple example above, the entire value of the 
asset passing at death would be unrealized gain, 
but without information on p, the probability of 
an asset sale in each year, it would not be possi-
ble to compute the present discounted value of 
the capital gains tax burden on the appreciated 
asset. Looking only at the asset composition of 
estates ignores the capital gain realizations that 
take place prior to death and that are reported on 
income tax returns. Nevertheless, if gains accrue 
each year and the annual probability of forced 
liquidation is high, unrealized gains will repre-
sent a smaller fraction of the fair market value 
of assets passed at death than if the probability 
p is low. Low values of gains relative to estate 
market value imply that p/( p + q) is close to 
one and that the present value of capital gains 
taxes on an appreciating asset is close to τ. A 
high value of unrealized gains relative to estate 
value suggests a low value of p/( p + q).
I. The 2010 “Voluntary” Estate Tax
The temporary expiration of the estate 
tax and associated basis  carryover regime in 
2010 provide a unique opportunity to explore 
the importance of unrealized capital gains in 
estates. The Economic Growth and Tax Reform 
Reconciliation Act of 2001 included a set of ris-
ing thresholds for estate tax liability between 
2001 and 2009, and a  one-year estate tax repeal 
effective January 1, 2010. Most tax policy ana-
lysts and tax planners expected the estate tax to 
be  reinstituted prior to this date, but it was not. 
For 2010, the estate tax was replaced by a basis 
carryover regime, in which assets transferred to 
heirs retained the decedent’s tax basis.
The Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance 
Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, 
which became law in December 2010, reinstated 
the estate tax retroactively effective January 1, 
2010. For estates of 2010 decedents, however, 
the estate tax was voluntary. While the default 
was for executors of such estates to file estate 
tax returns, and to receive basis  step-up on assets 
passed to beneficiaries, executors could also 
choose not to pay estate tax, and to carry over 
the basis of the decedent’s assets to beneficia-
ries. For some estates, the estate tax liability was 
less than the present discounted value of the cap-
ital gains tax liability associated with  carryover 
basis. A number of executors therefore chose to 
file estate tax returns and to pay estate tax on 
the estates of 2010 decedents, even though they 
were not required to do so.
The “voluntary” estate tax regime of 2010 led 
to sharp changes in estate tax filings. Data from 
adjacent years demonstrates this. The estate tax 
filing threshold, the value of the estate plus tax-
able gifts that triggered estate tax liability, was 
$3.5 million in 2009 and $5 million in 2010 and 
2011. Executors filed 7,948 estate tax returns for 
2009 decedents with wealth of over $5 million. 
There were 9,285 such filings for 2011 decedents. 
For 2010 decedents, by comparison, there were 
2,788 estate tax returns filed, roughly one-third 
the number of filings for estates worth over $5 
million in the previous year. The distribution of 
estate tax returns for 2010 was also quite different 
from that for 2009. Returns for which the gross 
estate and gifts were valued at between $5 and 
$10 million accounted for about two thirds of the 
estate tax returns for 2009 decedents, but for over 
80 percent of those for 2010 decedents. There 
were 1,046 estate tax returns with gross value of 
more than $20 million filed for 2009 decedents, 
1,206 such returns for 2011 decedents, but only 
146 such returns for 2010 decedents.
The more pronounced decline in the num-
ber of estate tax filings for decedents with large 
estates than for those with estates near the filing 
threshold is consistent with the comparison of 
potential estate and capital gains tax liabilities 
presented in Gordon, Joulfaian, and Poterba (2015). Because the estate tax for 2010 applied 
only to the net value of assets in excess of $5 
million, and because the capital gains tax rate 
for most beneficiaries would be less than the 
estate tax rate, for very large estates even with 
substantial unrealized gains the estate tax was 
likely to exceed the present value of the capital 
gains tax liability.
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II. Unrealized Capital Gains and 2010 Estates
The optional  carryover basis regime of 2010 
provides a rich opportunity to learn about the 
value of unrealized capital gains that are stepped 
up at death. If executors chose not to pay estate 
tax, they were required to file Form 8939, which 
contains information on the fair market value (FMV) of assets in the estate, their basis, and the 
allocation of the “additional basis” that was per-
mitted under the basis  carryover regime. Some 
assets, such as cash and  cash-equivalent assets 
and holdings in retirement plans, did not have to 
be reported on Form 8939. The beneficiaries of 
any estate that elected  carryover basis were eli-
gible for a $1.3 million increase in basis; spousal 
beneficiaries qualified for an additional $3 mil-
lion basis allocation. Thus for a 2010 decedent 
whose estate was left to his spouse, the basis on 
assets with up to $4.3 million in unrealized gains 
could be “stepped up” even under the  carryover 
basis regime.
The US Treasury Department Office of Tax 
Analysis (OTA 2014) summarizes the informa-
tion on unrealized gains as a share of market value 
for a subset of 5,505 Form 8939 filings which 
had been processed by Internal Revenue Service 
Statistics of Income (SOI) division by early 2014. 
OTA (2014) presents detailed tabulations of the 
value of unrealized gains for decedents in differ-
ent net worth, age, and gender categories. Our 
tabulations are similar, but they differ from the 
OTA (2014) findings because they are based on 
the full set of Form 8939 filings, 8,047 returns. 
Executors filed 4,152 Forms 8939 for 2010 dece-
dents for whom the fair market value of gross 
assets in their estate, plus taxable gifts that were 
reported between 2002 and 2010, exceeded $5 
million. The gross value of the estate, plus gifts, 
was between $5 and $10 million for 2,075, or just 
over half, of these returns. Another 853 returns 
fell in the $ 10 –15 million range, 360 were in the 
$ 15–20 million range, and 864 corresponded to 
estates for which gross assets plus gifts exceeded 
$20 million.
Our analysis begins with a sample of 8,047 
Form 8939 filings, but the sample is reduced to 
7,937 after we drop duplicate returns, typically 
amended returns, as well as returns rejected 
by the IRS because they were incomplete, 
 corresponded to the wrong year, or had other fil-
ing problems. The Form 8939 filings provide a 
rich source of information on the basis and the 
fair market value of assets in estates. The total 
fair market value (FMV) for the assets on these 
7,937 returns was $96.1 billion, with corre-
sponding unrealized gains of $41.8 billion. The 
ratio of unrealized gains to FMV, which we label 
the unrealized gain ratio (UGR), was 0.436. 
This ratio is somewhat greater than previous 
estimates. OTA (2014), Poterba and Weisbenner (2001), and Avery, Grodzicki, and Moore (2013) 
all estimate UGRs of about  one-third. If we add 
all of the assets reported on estate tax returns 
to those reported on Form 8939 filings, and 
assume that there were no unrealized gains on 
these assets, the ratio of unrealized gains to the 
market value of assets held by decedents would 
be 33.9 percent.
Aggregate information on the UGR conceals 
substantial variation across asset classes, likely 
due both to differences in the underlying rate of 
asset appreciation and to differences in the like-
lihood of selling the asset while alive. Table 1 
presents information on the UGR for the most 
 widely-held asset categories reported on Form 
8939 filings. Not surprisingly, fixed income 
instruments show very low UGRs, while equi-
ties and some real estate categories show much 
higher values. For state and local bonds, for 
example, unrealized gains were only 4.3 percent 
of the market value; for federal bonds, the UGR 
was 1.2 percent. By comparison, for vacant land 
the UGR was 61.7 percent, for closely held 
stock it was 72.5 percent, for corporate stock it 
was 63.1 percent, and for depletable assets and 
intangibles it was 83.6 percent. Since the value 
of basis  step-up may vary across different asset 
categories, this tax code provision is likely to 
have different effects on the effective capital 
gains tax rates on different assets.
Even within asset classes, there is substan-
tial heterogeneity in UGRs across Forms 8939. 
Table 2 reports on this variation for three asset 
classes with high average UGRs: closely held 
stock, other stock, which is typically publicly 
traded stock, and real estate. Although the aver-
age UGRs for these three asset classes were 
0.725, 0.631, and 0.453, respectively, a substan-
tial number of Form 8939 filings showed losses 
for each category. For closely held stock, 22 
percent of the Form 8939 filings showed losses; 
for other corporate stock, 19 percent, and for 
real estate, 21 percent. Losses represented 5.3 
percent of the net gains on corporate stock, 1.5 
percent of the gains on closely held stock, and 
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7.8 percent of the gains on real estate. There 
were also a substantial number of Form 8939 
filings for which gains represented most of the 
FMV of these asset classes.  Forty-two percent 
of the Form 8939 filings that included closely 
held stocks reported an unrealized gain of more 
than 70 percent of the fair market value of this 
asset position. For corporate stock the analogous 
value was 20.5 percent, and for real estate it was 
29.5 percent. The dispersion of UGRs even 
within asset classes is an important reminder of 
the range of possible return outcomes for risky 
assets. It also suggests the need to consider 
 loss-offset limitations in assessing the effective 
burden of capital gains taxes.
The basis  step-up provisions that apply in 
tandem with the US estate tax require benefi-
ciaries to value assets at the time of the dece-
dent’s death. Losses that accrued during the 
decedent’s lifetime are not passed forward to 
the beneficiary; there is no “step down” in basis. 
A beneficiary cannot sell assets that are worth 
less than the decedent’s basis and use the result-
ing losses to offset taxes on other gains. When 
Table 1—FMV and Basis on Carryover Basis Returns (Form 8939)
Asset category
Number of 
Form 8939 returns 
with asset class 
Conditional on positive holding
Mean
FMV (000s) 
Mean unrealized 
gain (000s)
Unrealized
gain/ FMV
All 7,937 12,110 5,285 0.436
Corporate stock 5,998 5,333 3,365 0.631
Personal residence 4,314 1,004 379 0.378
Other assets 4,107 305 62 0.203
State/local bonds 4,088 2,766 118 0.043
Real estate (excluding land) 4,050 1,958 887 0.453
Corporate/foreign bonds 2,368 621 37 0.060
Limited partnerships 1,915 3,326 1,322 0.398
Cash 1,824 948 61 0.064
Real estate mutual funds 1,577 222 84 0.379
Other federal bonds 1,505 1,203 14 0.012
Mutual funds 1,461 377 29 0.077
Vacant land 1,397 1,006 621 0.617
Closely held stock 1,297 6,912 5,011 0.725
Other  noncorporate businesses 1,253 3,580 806 0.225
Mortgages/notes 1,160 2,360 -92 −0.039
Bond funds 1,141 242 17 0.070
Annuities and retirement assets 766 1,553 821 0.529
Farms 756 2,628 1,567 0.596
Art 681 1,601 1,052 0.657
Real estate partnerships 628 3,817 2,066 0.541
Hedge funds/private equity 626 1,856 131 0.071
Depletable/intangible assets 540 1,111 929 0.836
Source: Authors’ tabulation using Form 8939 returns filed for year 2010 decedents.
Table 2—Distribution of Unrealized Gain Ratios by 
Asset Class
Ratio of gains
to FMV: UGR
Share 
of returns
Share 
of gains
Closely held stock (N = 1,297)
UGR < 0 22.1% −5.3%
0 < UGR < 0.2 10.6 0.8
0.2 < UGR < 0.4 9.7 3.0%
0.4 < UGR < 0.7 15.7 9.0%
UGR > 0.7 41.9 92.0
Corporate stock (N = 5,998)
UGR < 0 19.0% −1.5%
0 < UGR < 0.2 24.7 2.1
0.2 < UGR < 0.4 17.1 5.3
0.4 < UGR < 0.7 18.8 14.5
UGR > 0.7 20.5 79.6
Real estate
UGR < 0 20.8% −7.8%
0 < UGR < 0.2 12.8 2.7
0.2 < UGR < 0.4 13.6 8.9
0.4 < UGR < 0.7 23.3 35.5
UGR > 0.7 29.5 60.7
Source: Authors’ tabulation using Form 8939 returns filed 
for year 2010 decedents.
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 estimating the revenue consequences of shift-
ing to a  carryover basis regime, it is important 
to recognize the possibility of revenue losses 
associated with some taxpayers who will be 
able to pass forward losses that are currently lost 
at death.
The evidence presented in Bailey’s (1969) 
study of gain realization rates suggested that 
many of the assets that passed to beneficiaries 
might have been held for decades by the dece-
dents. The Form 8939 filings provide direct 
information on this issue. Table 3 presents 
data on the date of acquisition of closely held 
stock, other stocks, and real estate. For each of 
these asset categories, the executor could not 
identify the date of purchase for a significant 
fraction of the reported holdings: 17.1 percent 
for closely held stocks, 15.4 percent for other 
stocks, and 11 percent for real estate. Among 
the positions that could be identified with a 
purchase date, most of the gains were associ-
ated with assets that were held for more than 20 
years. For closely held stock, 64.2 percent of 
all gains, and 85 percent of all gains for which 
the purchase date was known, corresponded 
to assets that the decedent held for more than 
20 years. For real estate, the analogous values 
are 49.3 percent and 64.8 percent, respectively. 
For other corporate stock, only 24.8 percent 
of all gains correspond to positions that were 
known to have been purchased more than 20 
years ago, but these gains represent 71.9 per-
cent of all gains on stock positions with known 
start dates. These data are consistent with low 
realization rates and long holding periods for 
at least some assets held by high-net-worth 
investors.
III. Conclusions
The information on the unrealized gains and 
losses on assets that were included in the estates 
of decedents who passed away in 2010 provides 
useful information for estimating the potential 
revenue cost of basis  step-up. To translate this 
information into a revenue estimate, it must be 
augmented as in OTA (2014) with data on the 
value of unrealized gains on assets held by dece-
dents who were not required to file estate tax 
returns, because their estates were valued at less 
than $5 million, but who could still take advan-
tage of basis  step-up.
There are two limitations in using the Form 
8939 data from 2010 for either revenue esti-
mates or effective tax rate calculations. The first 
arises from the voluntary nature of the estate 
tax for 2010 decedents. If executors decided 
whether to elect the  carryover basis regime 
or the estate  tax-cum-basis  step-up regime 
based on the expected tax liability under the 
two regimes, then the observed Forms 8939 
represent a selected sample from the set of all 
estates. Gordon, Joulfaian, and Poterba (2015) 
present evidence that the projected differential 
in tax liability between the two tax regimes 
helped predict whether an executor would file 
an estate tax return or take advantage of the 
 carryover basis regime. The selection would 
lead to estates for which the value of basis 
 step-up was smallest filing Form 8939. It is 
difficult to determine how the reported Form 
8939 data should be adjusted to take account 
of this selection phenomenon. It nevertheless 
seems likely that the UGR on Form 8939 fil-
ings is an  underestimate of the ratio for the 
Table 3—Holding Period and UGR for Three Asset Classes
Holding period
at time of death 
Closely held stock (2,051 positions) Corporate stock (26,798 positions) Real estate (7,408 positions)
Percent of 
returns
Percent of
gains UGR
Percent of 
returns
Percent of
gains UGR
Percent of 
returns
Percent of
gains UGR
< 5 years 11.4 0.3 7.1 29.1 2.2 13.2 14.3 −0.2 −0.6
5–10 years 12.5 4.8 38.8 18.3 2.3 35.5 13.7 5.2 18.3
10 –15 years 12.4 2.7 40.9 12.4 2.8 50.4 12.4 10.8 41.6
15–20 years 9.8 3.5 53.7 8.0 2.4 68.2 9.4 10.0 52.8
> 20 years 36.8 64.2 84.7 16.9 24.8 88.3 39.2 49.3 72.3
Unknown 17.1 24.5 76.0 15.4 65.5 66.1 11.1 24.9 49.3
Note: Tabulations for the share of gains are drawn from information on the net gain for each position, so some entries under-
lying the gain calculation are losses. 
Source: Authors’ tabulations using Form 8939 return filings for 2010. 
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entire  decedent population, thus underestimat-
ing the revenue loss from basis  step-up. While 
our analysis focuses on net gains, some dece-
dents hold assets with substantial losses. Basis 
 step-up erases these losses and potentially 
increases the capital gains tax liability of the 
beneficiaries of these decedents.
The second limitation concerns the general-
izability of the asset gain and loss positions for 
2010. The voluntary estate tax regime occurred 
two years after the onset of the recent financial 
crisis. Asset values in some categories, such as 
real estate and corporate stock, may have been 
lower in 2010 than in more typical years.
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